Tad Tietze theguardian.com, Wednesday 31 July 2013 12.03 AEST
When voters name their top vote-determining issues, asylum is near the bottom of the list – and yet, the mythology persists. Rudd knows this and uses it efficiently
Kevin Rudd signs a cricket bat during the official launch of the ICC Cricket World Cup to be held in Australia and New Zealand in 2015. Photograph: Asanka Brendon Ratnayake/LNP
Does Kevin Rudd have a strategy, or is he just making it up as he goes along?
Much recent commentary seems to presume that Rudd – despite three years mercilessly pursuing a return to the top job – had no plan except to rely on his popularity. This view comes with talk of “sugar hits”, early election dates, policy shifts being part of “campaigning” and not “governing”, and the claim that he is just as poll-driven as the “faceless men” who ousted him in 2010.
Such an approach rests on the idea that politicians’ manoeuvres are mainly driven by voter opinion. This is nowhere more evident than on refugees where, since 2001, it has been gospel that being tough on boat arrivals is the key to “votes, votes and more votes”.
Yet there’s little evidence for this.
Take Rudd’s latest PNG solution. It has certainly improved the ALP’s standing on the issue. Newspoll showed Labor narrowed the gap with the Coalition on who is best to handle asylum by 20%, to be behind by 26 to 33%. Essential recorded an even bigger shift, of 24%, with Labor now behind by just 25 to 26%. And Galaxy actually had “Rudd Labor” ahead of the “Abbott Coalition” on the issue, by 40 to 38%.
Yet Labor’s vote has barely moved. Essential showed no shift in the Labor primary and a 1% rise in the two-party preferred (2PP). Galaxy showed a 2% rise in Labor’s primary but just 1% in the 2PP. Meanwhile, Newspoll recorded decreases of 1% primary and 2% 2PP.
This paradox – virtually ignored by journalists – shouldn’t surprise us. Serious analyses of the 2001 election (for example this, this and this) suggest that the “Tampa-as-election-winner” tale was little more than John Howard’s self-interested narrative, which then spooked ALP hardheads into becoming obsessed with pandering to allegedly racist voters, apparently mostly living in western Sydney. When voters are asked to name their top vote-determining issues, asylum continues to be near the bottom of the list. Yet the mythology persists, even after Labor’s NSW vote immediately recovered on Rudd’s return, despite him being seen as “soft on boats”.
Rather than being poll-obsessed, Rudd has been systematically out-manoeuvring his opponents in order to dominate them politically. These opponents include not just the Coalition and the Greens, but those in his party who represent the “old politics” he routinely attacks. To do this, Rudd deploys two key weapons — his popular appeal as an anti-politics outsider and the authority of the PM’s office.
Again, the refugee issue clarifies Rudd’s approach. Central to his strategy is the use of regional (international) statecraft to establish authority. By having Indonesia expose Abbott’s plan to “turn back the boats” as a dangerous fantasy and then convincing Papua New Guinea to resettle refugees, Rudd has called the Coalition’s bluff and shifted the terms of the debate. He brushes aside panic that his policy must show results overnight, instead counseling patient determination. And he has disoriented many on the left by answering their legal and humanitarian objections in brutal fashion.
Importantly, Rudd has neutralised troublesome internal forces – especially amongst his NSW right backers – who believe “tough on boats” is a vote-winner. This has given him space to refuse their demands for an early election, intended to “save the furniture” rather than win, which they have been trying to leverage by incessantly leaking dates. A later election will allow Rudd to be seen to govern, so that the contrast between him and Abbott – and between him and Gillard’s “Labor values” – is crystal clear.
For all their claims they had war-gamed Rudd’s return, the Coalition look shaken, off-message and whiney on almost every issue, unable to lay a glove on him. The Greens were similarly at sea until the PNG deal gave them something they could plausibly attack Rudd on.
Gillard’s politically disastrous prime ministership weakened the ALP power structures it was meant to restore. It has allowed Rudd, whose base within the party is very narrow, to be in a position to dominate opponents across the political spectrum and transform a near-certain Coalition landslide into a real contest. It has also allowed him to push through internal reforms to weaken the influence of the ALP machine and unions.
Perhaps it’s the scale of Rudd’s attack on Australia’s long-standing political arrangements that is leading many to be confused. Rudd is no left-wing radical in his social or economic policies. But there’s good reason for him to be always on the move: he still has much reshaping of politics to do before he’s finished. Those who don’t grasp this risk being swept aside in the rush.
