Tanya Plibersek theguardian.com, Wednesday 5 March 2014
The Abbott government has inherited Howard’s tendency to act unilaterally within our region – and it turns its back on Indonesia at its peril
‘Abbott clearly prioritises the Anglosphere at the expense of Asia’. Photograph: Saeed Khan/AFP/Getty Images
Indonesia has been clear that full co-operation with Australia will not be restored until agreement is reached on a “code of conduct” to govern key elements of the relationship.
The recent news that negotiations on the code of conduct have stalled is testament to just how badly Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has deteriorated under the Abbott government. This follows our ambassador in Jakarta getting a dressing down from Indonesian officials last month. But the government continues to say “there’s nothing to see here”. They argue that our relationship has always seen ups and downs. While that’s true, the last few months have seen significantly more downs. And Tony Abbott and Julie Bishop must take some responsibility.
The birth of Australia-Indonesia relations was characterised by solidarity. During Indonesia’s independence struggle, Australian unions and others played a key role in preventing the Dutch regaining control of the country. The Labor government, under Ben Chifley, took crucial and ultimately successful diplomatic steps to bring about Indonesia’s independence. The country’s independence leaders appreciated this support. Indeed, Indonesia’s foreign minister would later describe Australia as the “midwife” to the Indonesian republic.
While that was a clear peak in our bi-lateral relationship, there have been troughs too. In the 1960s, Australia supported Britain and Malaysia in their conflict with Indonesia. In contrast, the early 1990s saw Paul Keating lift the relationship to new heights of prominence - building personal ties with Indonesian President Suharto. Keating stated “no country is more important to Australia than Indonesia” but in 1999, relations plummeted again when John Howard (quite rightly) sent Australian peacekeepers to East Timor after that country chose independence.
Historically, these changes were often a factor of larger international events which reflected Australia’s stand on matters of principle. However, more recently, it’s harder to make the case that occasional tensions are a necessary by-product of principled Australian foreign policy.
For instance, rather than repairing ties with Indonesia following East Timor (as the East Timorese themselves seem to have done), prime minister Howard went on to drive the relationship into deep freeze. In 2004, well into Howard’s time as prime minister, Australian National University expert on regional affairs Greg Fealy,stated “the Howard government remains one of the most unpopular foreign governments in Indonesia”. This was reflected in Indonesian president Megawati Soekarnoputri refusing to meet Howard or return his phone calls. All that at a time of heightened terror threat – when the safety of Australians relied so much on cooperation with Indonesia.
When Labor returned to government in 2007, there was an opportunity to recalibrate the relationship. There was a chance for a fresh start. This was embraced wholeheartedly and from 2007-2012 there were around 130 high-level government visits between Australia and Indonesia - about one every fortnight. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono addressed Australia’s parliament. We elevated Indonesia to the top echelon of Australia’s strategic relationships, including it in the list of countries with whom we consult prior to preparing defence policy statements.
Despite challenges in relation to live cattle exports, the relationship remained strong. A poll in 2012 found that Indonesian views of Australia had gone from “lukewarm” in 2006, to “warm” in 2012. In contrast to the Howard years, by 2012, out of 21 countries Australia was the fourth most warmly regarded. This allowed improved co-operation on asylum seeker issues too, with Indonesia cancelling visas on arrival arrangements for Iranians, dramatically reducing the number of Iranians transiting through Indonesia to Australia.
Then came the Coalition’s 2013 victory, following an election campaign that raised the eyebrows of our neighbour. There is no need to rehash that example of Abbott’s diplomatic mishandling here.
But what sits behind the Coalition’s approach to Indonesia? The answer lies in its broader foreign policy agenda. Despite saying before the election that his foreign policy would be “more Jakarta and less Geneva”, Abbott clearly prioritises the Anglosphere at the expense of Asia. The Abbott government has inherited Howard’s tendency to act unilaterally within our region.
This is compounded by the Coalition’s poor understanding of the cultures of our close neighbours, and the relative importance they place on values like respect and honour. To make the relationship more resilient, the Abbott government must work to improve Australia’s image in the eyes of Indonesia. Allowing anti-Australian sentiment to become entrenched in Indonesia’s domestic political debate would be a grave mistake.
All this is critical because it impacts our national interest. Indonesia is important to Australia’s security. Our neighbour is the largest and most powerful state in Southeast Asia. We must not forget that the US and China have close relations with Indonesia, and the importance these two world powers place on Indonesia is only likely to grow. There are, of course, the obvious economic benefits too: Indonesia is our 12th largest export market and is set to be the world’s 10th largest economy by 2025.
Labor worked to strengthen ties with Indonesia because it was good for Australia, and our region. The Abbott government turns its back on on Indonesia to its peril.
